with BRUCE HOFFMAN
“They are unfortunate and isolated individuals. They are bankrupt. Their role has already been ruled out. Go where you belong from now more- a dirty dustbin of history “.
So, in 1917, Leon Trotsky condemned the Mensheviks, the faction no Bolshevik Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Russia, to a destination that insignificancia- never recovered . Only five years ago, the fall of al Qaeda similarly seemed imminent . Its founder and leader was dead. A succession of key lieutenants had been Deleted . And the region was transformed by the Arab Spring . Civil protest, apparently, had achieved what terrorism achievement not deliver – and al Qaeda was the biggest loser. John O. Brennan , then Deputy Assistant for National Security and Counterterrorism and Assistant to the President, said at a hearing convened in a meeting at Washington DC in April 2012 , “for the first time since this fight began, we can look forward to a world view in which the center of al Qaeda is simply not relevant “. Less than a month later, on the first anniversary of the death of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, the US president, Barack Obama , proudly proclaims that “ The objective -the set defeat al Qaeda and deny him the chance of reconstruirse- is within our reach. “
What looks completely different today. in February Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper , paints a bleak picture singular, the a new al Qaeda and resurgent together with an ambitious and expansionist Islamic State (ISIS) in its annual assessment of global threats . Al Qaeda and its affiliates, has Clapper to Committee of the Armed Forces in the Senate , “have proven to be resilient, and are positioned to make gains in 2016 … continue n be a threat to local, regional and possibly global interests “. More alarming still, and s the emergence of a current ultimate . ISIS says, “ It has become the terrorist threat more preminente because of its self-proclaimed caliphate in Syria and Iraq, its branches and branches in other countries, and its growing ability to lead and inspire attacks a wide range of targets around the world. “
If a week is a long time for politics, five years it is an eternity. it’s easy to forget, until very recently, that there was an Islamic state run by the ISIS ; the alleged caliphate Abu al-Baghdadi was nothing more than a self-indulgent dream. In fact limits Sykes and Picot seemed ineradicable ( N. R .: the Sykes-Picot, agreement known as the Agreement of Asia Minor, was a secret agreement between Britain and France to define the influence and control of the two countries in the Middle East if they won the Ottoman Empire 1st. World War ), and both Obama and vice President Joe Biden were announcing stabilization of democracy in Iraq , and the consequent withdrawal of military forces of the United States as proof that “the US war in Iraq” had “finished”.
Given this amazing concatenation of events in a short period of time, it is very likely that they occurred more surprises. In fact, for 2021, al Qaeda and Isis could merge, or at least get into some kind of alliance or tactical cooperation. Although admittedly unlikely in near terms, such an approach would have a whole lot of sense for both groups and no doubt result in a threat, according to an analyst with US intelligence particularly recognized who I asked for this possibility “It would be an absolute and unprecedented disaster for the USG and our allies.”
Poor predictions
the United States suffering collective amnesia where policies against terrorism and terrorism are concerned. After all, it was only yesterday that conventional wisdom within the Beltway ( N. R .: Interstate 495 is an Interstate 103 km long around the US capital Washington DC and suburban Maryland and Virginia. “Inside the Beltway” is a phrase used for political affairs of government ) was that bloody separation between al Qaeda and ISIS consume, castrate and destroy completely both groups . Conventional thinking about al Qaeda was rare right time anyway, then it is no surprise that this particular expectation is a little more than a simple desire. And it is reason enough to explore why reason a connection between al Qaeda and ISIS is not as far fetched as some argue .
There are at least four arguments that leave this acceptable scenario.
1ro., the ideological similarities between ISIS and al Qaeda are more significant than their differences . Both groups adhere to the first principle outlined by the founder of al Qaeda member, Abdullah Azzam , three decades ago: is the duty of every Muslim wherever he may be, to defend his brother wherever you are threatened or endangered. for Azzam much as Bin Laden and the current leader of al Qaeda, Ayman al Zawahiri, and the leader of ISIS, Baghdadi, an aggressive and predatory war is being waged against Islam by their enemies . These enemies are generally conceived as infidels and nonbelievers , including Western liberal democracy, corrupt and repressive local apostles supported by the West, and Shi’a Muslims and other minorities. In this inevitable clash of civilizations , is for all Muslims to defend the global Muslim community. The need for global jihad to defeat all perceived enemies of Islam is thus an integral aspect to the ideology of ISIS and al Qaeda .
Both movements also share the view that Western State system is against the imposition of Sharia (Islamic law) . ISIS, for example, regularly inveighs against democracy like “evil approach” . In that sense, the group reflects the old view of al Qaeda this system of government. Like al Qaeda, ISIS is also against Western control most precious resource-the Muslim oilfields and natural gas -. and the creation of a corrupt willing support of local regimes that facilitate exploration and continuous operation
as al Qaeda in recent years, the ISIS invites military intervention West in Muslim lands, which, the group believes, will enervate the military and economic local regimes. “If you fight against us” proclaimed ISIS in 2014, “we will become stronger and stronger, and if we leave them alone we will grow and expand. “
2nd., the differences between ISIS and al Qaeda are rooted more in a clash of egos and tones that substance . For now, the most salient impediment to reconciliation is the strong personal and vicious rivalry between Zawahiri Baghdadi and enmity. It is clearly obvious that they hate each other. Their dispute, however, appears to be based on process and time. In short, Zawahiri still claims the distant enemy must be completely removed and purified Muslim lands of the West and other corrupt local influences, before the Caliphate can be established. Baghdadi as the events of June 2014 showed, sees no reason to wait and instead takes the offensive by attacking nearby enemies in Syria and Iraq, and declared himself caliph.
the styles of the two men also differ . Baghdadi has created a personality cult around him that abounds in death and dismemberment. He is nostalgic for the Khmer Rouge of Pol Pot and the Tamil Tigers, Velupillai Prabhkaran of that Azzam, bin Laden or Zawahiri. Megalomania Baghdadi proclaimed back to a family lineage that reaches the Prophet. Their situation makes it more difficult to identify a credible successor. Consequently, removing Baghdadi could send the ISIS to total chaos and give al Qaeda ideal for making a voluntary or forced marriage opportunity. For this case, both Baghdadi’s death or Zawahiri could pave the way for an approach , whether this involves an agreed meeting or a hostile takeover of one group to another. The attack gainst Baghdadi in Raqqah in December 2014 by a pro al Qaeda member, however, suggests that a more likely scenario would be al Qaeda absorb the ISIS instead of the otherwise . Despite this, the result would be a combined terrorist force of incredible dimensions.
The 3rd. argument that supports a union of al Qaeda-ISIS is that both groups use the same strategy . Although the ISIS applies most faithful and viciously. In fact is the accession of Baghdadi the stylebook of al Qaeda which explains his attack in June 2014 to declare the resurrection of the Caliphate and the establishment of the Islamic State.
The strategy was organized by the operating head al Qaeda Saif al Adl in 2005. The ISIS is currently in its 5th. 7. step The first was the awakening (2000-2003), which coincided with the 09/11 attacks, described as “ awakening of the nation by giving a powerful blow to the head of the serpent in the United States. “ that was followed by the step ” open your eyes “(2003-2006) that developed after the US invasion of Iraq, and supposedly was designed to address and drain perpetually USA and the West in a series of protracted abroad. The stages of “Get up and stand standing” (2007-2010) involved the proactive expansion into new places to operate, as they did in East Africa and the Levant.
The 4th. stage, “Recovery ” (2010 – 2013) was originally developed to allow al Qaeda consolidate its forces. Consequence of the death of Bin Laden and new opportunities overthrow regimes apostles ( N. R .: Local governments that are functional to the West ) provided by the Arab Spring , this stage ended must be adjusted or corrected. Caught by the popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, Al Qaeda tried to take advantage of the political chaos and suck the authority to re-establish its presence and exploit new opportunities as internal uprisings re strengthened and expanded. This was facilitated by the release of thousands of jihaditas and people in positions of leadership. This 4th. stage in the strategy of Adl, would be followed by the stage of “ Statement by State Caliphate ” (2013 – 2016) when al Qaeda would reach its ultimate goal of establish a trans Islamic regime or supranational over large swaths of territory in the Muslim world. The ISIS stole the march to al Qaeda in this regard . 6th. step, “total confrontation” (2016 – 2020), was made to happen after the Caliphate was created and an Islamic Army could start the ” final battle between believers and nonbelievers “ the final and definitive .” statement of victory “ (2020 – 2022) occurs when the Caliphate finally triumphs over the world .
it is disturbing to see, from the point of view of ISIS, the movements are happening on time. Equally chilling is that the apocalyptic elements of the 7th. and last step are clearly evident in the ideology and strategy of ISIS. His vision involves a possible struggle between Islam and infidels in Dabiq, Syria ( N R .: A phrase of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who died in 2006, founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq. “The spark has on here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify, with the permission of Ala- until the Crusaders in Dabiq armies burn. “it is mentioned in the H ADICES (such the prophet Muhammad) as the biblical equivalent of the Apocalypse or Armageddon, and is the place where Muslims and Christian armies will clash in their last battle ) -name chosen by the group for its online magazine. In other words, ISIS goals will never be only local but, as al Qaeda, are global.
The 4th. why al Qaeda and ISIS will eventually join is that efforts to meet the groups have regularly been the characteristic of the behavior and rhetoric from both sides . The ISIS proclaims himself as the most faithful reincarnation and effective agent of the vision of Bin Laden, and said that under Zawahiri, al Qaeda has deviated from its historic mission and the great ambitions that once teetered on the brink of get. In this respect, it is not then surprising that propaganda ISIS is deeply reverential to Bin Laden and deeply respectful of al Qaeda (although not Zawahiri) referring to his soldiers, emirs and sheikhs in a positive way and continuing glorifying Bin Laden’s achievements.
for its part Zawahiri has been very careful in his statements publicly released to maintain the prospect of reconciliation . The declaration of September 2015, for example, he makes this statement: “I hereby confirm clearly and unequivocally that if there was conflict between the Crusaders, Safavids and secularists, with any group of Muslims and Mujahideen including group of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and those with him, our only option is to support the mujahideen Muslims, even if they are unjust to us, we have slandered and have broken covenants and stolen from the Ummah and the mujahideen their right to consult and select your Caliphate, and I escaped being commanded by Shariah in disputes “.
These proposals are not purely rhetorical , as last serious attempt to get a modus vivendi clear. In the last 3 occasions in the second half of 2014, the stars almost aligned:
& gt; in September, shortly after the US and its coalition began airstrikes against ISIS seriously;
& gt; in November, after Baghdadi was incapacitated by a US bombing; and
& gt; in December followed the coup in Raqqah.
Possible problems
For nearly a decade and a half, al Qaeda and the Salafist terrorist network, has defied efforts Westerners take the fight to a definitive end. Their longevity is both a history of errors in the US and misinterpretation of the threat as great capacity for change, adaptation and regeneration of its adversaries. The East now faces an enemy who has transcended the tactics of terrorism obvious military capabilities, which certifies that the terrorist challenge has only become more variegated, diffuse, and exponentially more difficult to overcome.
the insistent statements of the last 5 years that al Qaeda is positioned on the edge of a strategic defeat have been turning more time than it took to defeat Nazi Germany and the Japanese Empire. It’s hard to think of a worse constellation of terrorist threats that already proposed ISIS and al Qaeda affiliates, associates, franchises and provinces. Any coordination of terrorist actions, much less a modus vivendi more formal, would have a profound and far-reaching international security consequences.
That scenario is no less acceptable than the notion of the Salafist movement 2014 to exercise sovereignty over parts of Iraq, Libya and Syria, with multiple outposts in the north, East and West Africa, the Sinai and Afghanistan. It is also possible that, given the fact that these movements have endured a concentrated attack on the technological and doctrinally sophisticated military force in history, expectations of success have repeatedly deleted because of new tragedies as November 2015 Paris, and in March 2016 in Brussels attacks, enough to take seriously the possibility of an alliance between ISIS and al Qaeda reason.
No comments:
Post a Comment